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REPLY TO SIMION 
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ABSTRACT: Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking 
back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have 
claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a 
difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the 
task of explaining the difference in a way that keeps it from undermining the 
knowledge norm. The explanation she offers is in terms of a distinction between doing 
something that is wrong and doing something that is blameworthy. I respond here by 
defending the distinction and questioning the explanation she gives of it. 
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Mona Simion1 questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an 
assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I claimed in arguing 
against the knowledge norm of assertion.2 After arguing against the distinction in 
question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to 
illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining the difference in 
a way that keeps it from undermining the knowledge norm. The explanation she 
offers is in terms of a distinction between doing something that is wrong and 
doing something that is blameworthy.  
I have elsewhere addressed the idea of salvaging the knowledge norm by 
appeal to a distinction between violating a norm and being blameworthy for doing 
so, both in “Norms of Assertion”3 and more extensively in Rationality and 
Reflection,4 especially chapters 2 and 3. The arguments there attack directly the 
idea that any distinction between blameworthiness and impropriety of some more 
fundamental sort, or more generally between any primary notion of propriety and 
some secondary notion, can explain away the purported counterexamples to the 
knowledge norm of assertion. I argue that such distinctions misunderstand the 
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nature of fundamental normativity, treating it in the way that is best reserved for 
some derivative domains, such as the legal sphere, where the normativity in 
question is partially a function of some more fundamental normativity.  
Since the second part of Simion’s paper does not engage with these 
arguments, I will bypass responding to that part of her paper here, since the 
general approach she takes is addressed already in the material cited above. I’ll 
focus, then, on the claim that the distinction between two kinds of taking back is 
mistaken.  
One example I used to illustrate the distinction is as follows:  
For example, if we assert a claim and then are shown that the claim is false, we 
take back the content of our speech act, but we needn’t apologize for or regret 
the very act itself. Randy says, “I’ve studied music all my life; there’s no piece of 
group music even moderately well-known in the U.S. where part of the group is 
playing in 15/16 time and another part in 17/16 time,” to which Michael 
responds, “That’s certainly a reasonable judgment, except that you don’t know 
enough about King Crimson. They are moderately well-known, and they have 
just such a piece.” Michael then shows Randy the piece (so, I’m assuming that 
Michael is correct), to which Randy says, “I was wrong, I take it back.” Now 
Randy may regret his assertion if he is the sort of person who strongly dislikes 
confronting his own fallibility. He may even vow to be much more careful not to 
say anything at all when he risks being wrong in order not to repeat this 
embarrassing moment, though such a response is surely overblown. Chagrin is 
normal, even mild embarrassment, but apologizing would be unctuous and 
overwrought. As I told the story, Randy responds appropriately. He doesn’t 
apologize for making the assertion, but what he does instead is take back the 
content of the assertion. In fact, were he to apologize, the natural response would 
be dismissive: “Give it a rest, nobody’s always right …”5  
Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases where an apology 
is appropriate and cases where it is not, but claims that the explanation of the 
difference can’t be given in terms of a distinction between taking back the speech 
act itself and taking back its content:  
But if the propositional content is inert in isolation, it is less clear how Kvanvig 
envisages one being able to take it back in isolation. To see this, notice that 
assertion, as opposed to other types of actions—say, having vacationed in 
Hawaii—can be ‘taken back.’ Not in the sense that one can change the past as to 
not have had asserted in the first place, of course. Rather, taking back an 
assertion that p refers to no longer standing behind the commitments implied by 
having asserted that p. Now, p itself, in isolation, does not imply any 
commitments whatsoever. That is, depending on which illocutionary force we 
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will act upon it with, different commitments will follow. If I promise that p, for 
instance, I commit myself to a future course of action; if I assert that p, I commit 
myself to, at least, it being the case that p. 
If that is the case, it becomes clear that in order to take an assertion back, that 
is, to be released from the commitments implied by it, it has to be the case that I 
take back everything, force and content. I cannot only take back the content p, 
because p in isolation does not commit me to anything, inasmuch as I do not 
present it as true, or command p, or promise p, etc. Also, I cannot only take the 
action back either, because presenting nothing as true, or promising nothing also 
fails to imply any commitments on my part.6  
Simion notes that content is inert in isolation, taking on various types of 
force depending on the kind of speech act in which the content is embedded. As a 
result, taking back the content of an assertion can’t involve retracting some speech 
act itself, unless one takes back both the content and the assertion simultaneously. 
Hence, if the taking back is supposed to draw a distinction between taking back 
one kind of speech act versus taking back another kind of speech act, the 
distinction cannot be drawn.  
It should be noted, however, that in the example I used above, as well as 
elsewhere in the paper, the distinction is not drawn in terms of two different 
kinds of speech acts. One side of the distinction applies to a speech act, for when 
one apologizes for, or regrets, an assertion, the object of one’s attitude is the 
assertion itself, which is a speech act. But when one takes back only the content of 
an assertion, one does not have a speech act as the object of one’s attitude nor of 
the act of taking back. Instead, the object of the taking back is whatever 
intellectual commitment to the claim led to the assertion in the first place, and 
what one is doing is countermanding that commitment. Thus, to take back the 
content of an assertion, as opposed to taking back the speech act itself, has as its 
object a commitment which is a mental state or act. In the usual case, such a 
commitment would be either a belief (a mental state) or the adoption of it (a 
mental act). 
This distinction alone does not undermine the knowledge norm of 
assertion, but is merely one cog in a machine aimed at undermining that account. 
It is a defensive maneuver aimed at showing that the acknowledgement of a lapse 
of some sort, when it is pointed out that we don’t know what we are talking 
about, is not the right kind of acknowledgement to justify endorsing the 
knowledge norm. So long as there are differences in this regard concerning the 
cases I describe, these cases can fulfill this defensive task whether or not the 
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differences are properly characterized in terms of a distinction between taking 
back the assertion itself versus taking back its content. Simion objects to this way 
of explaining the differences, but, as I’ve argued, I don’t think her concerns 
undermine this approach. 
